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NOTE 
MAKING-UP CONDITIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT: 
THE UNEQUAL BURDENS TEST AS 
A FLAWED MODE OF ANALYSIS 
IN JESPERSEN v. HARRAH'S 
OPERATING CO. 
INTRODUCTION 
Employers may require employees to follow particular appearance 
and grooming standards as part of an employment agreement. I While 
grooming policies usually require a neat and sometimes uniformed 
appearance, some may also require employees to alter their identity to a 
discriminatory extent? Darlene Jespersen, a bartender at Harrah's 
Casino in Reno, Nevada, faced such a policy when Harrah's imposed a 
mandatory makeup requirement for all female beverage servers.3 When 
Jespersen refused to adhere to the makeup requirement, Harrah's 
terminated her for failure to comply with the policy.4 
Title VII protects employees from discriminatory treatment based 
I See, e,g" Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235, 237 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Fountain 
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 754 (9th Cir. 1977); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan 
Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028, 1029-30 (7th Cir. 1979); Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 
845, 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2000); Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1077 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 2004) [Jespersen II]. 
2 See id. 
3 Jespersen /I, 392 F.3d at 1077-78. 
4 Id. at 1077. 
45 
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on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."s However, the Ninth 
Circuit excluded certain appearance and grooming policies from Title 
VII protection in 1974 by holding that employers may impose sex-
distinct appearance and grooming policies.6 In the Ninth Circuit today, 
appearance and grooming standards fall under Title VII regulation, but 
face analysis under the unequal burdens test.7 This test weighs employee 
burdens imposed by sex-distinct employment policies.s 
Courts must find that a policy places an unequal burden on one sex 
for a sex-distinct appearance and grooming policy to be ruled 
discriminatory under Title VII.9 In Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 
Jespersen challenged the Harrah's makeup requirement as imposing a 
disparate burden on female employees. IO She presented evidence such as 
the psychological impact of the requirement and the effect of the policy 
on her job performance. II Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, however, found this was insufficient evidence of an 
unequal burden to warrant protection under the unequal burdens test. 12 
The unequal burdens test provides employees insufficient protection 
from discrimination. By including considerations of gender stereotyping 
as well as the degree of job-relatedness, the Ninth Circuit could provide 
more sufficient protection for employees. Part I of this Note reviews 
Title VII and foundational caselaw, including cases regarding sex 
discrimination and appearance standards. 13 Part II examines the Ninth 
Circuit's Jespersen opinion. 14 Part III compares the Supreme Court 
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which expanded Title VII 
protection to include gender stereotyping, with the Jespersen holding. IS 
Part III also explores a Seventh Circuit case, Carroll v. Talman Federal 
Savings and Loan Association of Chicago, and Judge Thomas's dissent 
in Jespersen, which both argue for inclusion of less tangible factors such 
as gender stereotyping in the unequal burdens test. 16 Part III finally 
5 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2005). 
6 Baker, 507 F.2d at 898. 
7 Frank, 216 F.3d at 854-55; Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at 1080. 
S See Baker, 507 F.2d at 897; see also Fountain, 555 F.2d at 756; Frank, 216 F.3d at 854-
55; Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at 1083. 
9 Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at 1081. 
10 Id. at 1078-79. 
II Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 280 F. Supp.2d 1189, 1193-94 (D. Nev. 2002). aff'd, 
392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) [Jespersen 1]. 
11 See Jespersen I, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1190; Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at 1083. 
13 See infra notes 19 to 74 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 75 to 124 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 125 to 172 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 125 to 172 and accompanying text. 
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contends that the unequal burdens test should consider a job-relatedness 
element in the initial weighing of burdens based on the intent of Title 
VII. 17 Finally, this Note concludes that by incorporating intangible 
considerations such as gender stereotyping and weighing job-relatedness 
in the plaintiff s initial showing under the unequal burdens test, the Ninth 
Circuit will better protect employees from discriminatory appearance and 
grooming standards. 18 
I. BACKGROUND 
Congress implemented the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to protect 
American citizens from various forms of discrimination. 19 The Act 
prohibits discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.,,2o Title VII of this Act governs employment discrimination.21 
Ninth Circuit caselaw, however, initially excluded appearance and 
grooming standards from Title VII protection and later subjected them to 
a less stringent analysis than other forms of sexual discrimination?2 The 
Ninth Circuit's approach provides insufficient protection for employees 
from discriminatory appearance and grooming policies. 
A. TITLE VII 
Discriminatory treatment against an individual because of "race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin" is an unlawful employment 
practice under Title VII. 23 There are two classes of Title VII claims that 
potential plaintiffs can establish: one of disparate impact and one of 
disparate treatment.24 Disparate impact claims charge that an employer's 
practice is facially neutral but its effects fall "more harshly on one group 
17 See infra notes 125 to 172 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 173 to 176 and accompanying text. 
19 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
20 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2 (2005). 
21 [d. 
22 See Baker, 507 F.2d at 897; see also Fountain, 555 F.2d at 756; Frank, 216 F.3d at 854-
55; Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at \083. 
23 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2 (2005) ("Employer Practices. It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer- I. to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other wise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 2. to 
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin."). 
24 Frank, 216 F.3d at 853. 
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than another.,,25 A disparate treatment claim challenges an employer's 
policy as treating some employees less favorably than others based on 
one of the protected categories: sex, race, color, national origin, or 
religion.26 
Title VII sets forth one exception regarding disparate employment 
pOlicies?7 Employers may apply distinct policies to different groups if 
the policy is justified by a "Bona Fide Occupational Qualification" 
("BFOQ,,).28 The BFOQ exception is extremely limited in scope and 
authorizes employment decisions to be gender-based if, as a 
qualification, the distinction is "reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation" of that particular business.29 Therefore, if the employer can 
prove that the disparate treatment is a requirement compelled by 
reasonable business considerations and related to job skills, then the 
different standards are justified under Title VII.30 In all other instances, 
however, Title VII protects employees from discrimination based on 
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.,,3) 
B. TITLE VII CASELA w AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH 
In evaluating Title VII sex discrimination claims, Ninth Circuit 
caselaw distinguishes between discrimination regarding immutable and 
mutable characteristics?2 Discrimination based on "'immutable 
characteristics' of race, national origin, color, or sex,,33 are evaluated 
25 [d. (referring to a policy that does not distinguish or differentiate between groups in the 
explicit terms or language of the regulation or standard). 
26 [d. ("Disparate treatment is permissible under Title vn only if justified as a bona fide 
occupational qualification ('BFOQ'). A BFOQ is a qualification that is reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation or essence of an employer's business."). 
2742 U.S.c. § 20ooe-2 (2005). 
28 [d. ("Businesses or enterprises with personnel qualified on basis of religion, sex, or 
national origin .... Notwithstanding any other provision of this title [42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e, et seq.], 
(I) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees .. 
. on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or 
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation 
of that particular business or enterprise .... "). 
29 Frank, 216 F.3d at 855. 
30 [d. ("It is true that not all sex-differentiated appearance standards constitute disparate 
treatment that must be justified under Title vn as BFOQs. An appearance standard that imposes 
different but essentially equal burdens on men and women is not disparate treatment. A sex-
differentiated appearance standard that imposes unequal burdens on men and women is disparate 
treatment that must be justified as BFOQ."). 
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2005). 
32 Baker, 507 F.2d at 897. 
33 [d. 
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under the traditional McDonnell Douglas formulation. 34 By contrast, 
mutable characteristics include those traits that an employee has the 
power to change such as hair length, appearance, and grooming.35 
Notably, the Ninth Circuit's evaluation of discriminatory conduct is more 
lenient regarding mutable characteristics.36 
1. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 
To prevail under a claim for disparate treatment based on sex, the 
employee first needs to establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
based on the factors formulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green: 
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under 
the statute of establishing a prima facie case of [racial] discrimination. 
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a [protected] 
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the 
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, 
he was rejected; and (iv) that after his rejection, the position remained 
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 
complainant's qualifications.37 
Once the employee demonstrates these elements, the burden shifts to the 
employer to produce some "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the 
treatment.38 If the employer presents such a reason, the employee has an 
opportunity to prove that the employer's justification is pretextual, and 
that the true reason for the adverse action was based on discrimination 
prohibited by Title VII. 39 The McDonnell Douglas analysis protects 
employees because it permits a plaintiff to prove the elements of the 
claim and provides the plaintiff with an opportunity to challenge a 
potentially pretextual reason for the discriminatory action.40 
34 Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 1982). 
35 Jespersen 1/, 392 F.3d at 1080 ("Because grooming and dress standards regulated 
'mutable' characteristics such as hair length, we reasoned, employers that made compliance with 
such standards a condition of employment discriminated on the basis of their employees' 
appearance, not their sex."). 
36 1d. 
37 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
38 Gerdnm, 692 F.2d at 608. 
39 Id. (meaning a false justification used to cover up the employer's alleged prejudicial 
treatment). 
40 See id. 
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2. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court extended Title VII protection for 
sex discrimination claims by ruling that gender stereotyping may not 
playa role in employment decisions.41 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
the plaintiff alleged sex discrimination against Price Waterhouse for 
denying her partnership at the accounting fmn.42 The Price Waterhouse 
Policy Board' S43 ("Policy Board") reasons for the denial were 
characteristics including aggressiveness and "overcompensat[ing] for 
being a woman.'M The Policy Board member who informed the plaintiff 
of the firm's decision advised her to "walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair styled, 
and wear jewelry.'.45 The Court ruled in the plaintiffs favor, finding that 
the Policy Board wrongly considered evaluations "motivated by 
stereotypical notions about women's proper deportment.'.46 Similar to 
discrimination based on race or religion, the Court stated that gender 
must not play any role in employment determinations.47 
3. Ninth Circuit Caselaw 
The Ninth Circuit continually treats appearance and grooming 
41 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superceded by statute, Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(ii)(3)(m) (2005). 
42 [d. at 232. 
43 [d. at 232-33 ("At Price Waterhouse ... a senior manager becomes a candidate for 
partnership when the partners in her local office submit her name as a candidate. All of the other 
partners in the firm are then invited to submit written comments on each candidate .... [Tlhe firm's 
Admissions Committee makes a recommendation to the Policy Board. The Policy Board then 
decides whether to submit the candidate's name to the entire partnership for a vote, to 'hold' her 
candidacy, or to reject her. The recommendation of the Admissions Committee, and the decision of 
the Policy Board, are not controlled by fixed guidelines: a certain number of positive comments from 
partners will not guarantee a candidate's admission to the partnership, nor will a specific quantity of 
negative comments necessarily defeat her application."). 
44 [d. 
45 [d. 
46 [d. at 256, 258. Looking to the intent behind the passage of Title vn the Court stated, "[als 
for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate 
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for 
'[iln forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress 
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes. '" [d. The Court read the language of Title vn to say "gender must be irrelevant to 
employment decisions." [d. Price Waterhouse denied the plaintiff partnership because she did not fit 
the employer's expectation of how a woman should act. [d. This decision took considerations of 
sex and gender into account. [d. According to the Supreme Court, such a determination. made with 
considerations of gender, is discriminatory under Title vn. [d. 
47 [d. at 243. 
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policies differently from other employment policies regulated by Title 
VII.48 In Baker, the Ninth Circuit carved out an exception to Title VII, 
holding that employers can impose sex-distinct appearance and grooming 
policies without violating Title VI149 The plaintiff in Baker had 
challenged a grooming policy that tolerated long hair for female 
employees but prohibited male employees from having long hair.5o The 
Ninth Circuit held that Congress did not intend Title VII to define 'sex' 
as broadly as to allow challenges to an employer's regulations regarding 
appearance or grooming.51 Therefore, the employer permissibly 
terminated the plaintiff because he did not comply with his employer's 
short-hair requirement, not because he was a male.52 The Ninth Circuit's 
holding in Baker excluded appearance and grooming standards from the 
scope of Title VII discrimination actions based on the rationale that it 
constituted discrimination based on appearance, a mutable characteristic, 
instead of the immutable characteristic of sex.53 
In Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., the Ninth Circuit expanded the 
Baker holding by stating that employers have discretion, but are not 
required, to change employment policies in response to employee 
protest.54 In Fountain, the employer altered the female dress code to 
allow women to wear pants after a protest by the female employees.55 
Similarly, the employer altered the hair length requirement to allow male 
employees to wear longer hairstyles. 56 However, the employer refused to 
alter a policy requiring male employees to wear ties.57 The court held 
that the employer's distinct requirement that only male employees wear 
ties was justified by the employer's authority to create sex-distinct 
48 See, e.g., Baker, 349 F. Supp. at 237; Fountain, 555 F.2d at 754; Frank, 216 F.3d at 847, 
854; Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at 1077 n.!. 
49 Baker, 507 F.2d at 898. 
50 Id. at 896. 
51 /d. ("We agree with the district court that a private employer may require male employees 
to adhere to different modes of dress and grooming than those required of female employees and 
such does not constitute an unfair employment practice within the meaning of 42 U.S.c. §2000e-
2(a)."). 
52 Id. at 897-98 (referring to a 1971 United States Supreme Court case involving a Title VII 
challenge, the court further explained, "[o)bviously, it seems to us, the [Supreme) Court was not 
talking in terms of hair styles or modes of dress over which the job applicant has complete control. 
The Court was addressing itself to characteristics which the applicant, otherwise qualified, had no 
power to alter."). 
53 Id. at 898 (,The character of appellant's sex does not seem to have been a deterrent to his 
qualifications or he would not have obtained the job in the first place. It was his violation of the 
company grooming standards ... which appears to have caused his termination, not his sex."). 
54 Fountain. 555 F.2d at 756. 
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regulations. 58 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit underscored the importance 
of employer discretion in composing a professional public image. 59 
Accordingly, under Fountain employers not only have the power to 
make sex-distinct appearance and grooming standards, they have the 
right to make discretionary changes to those standards.6o 
4. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc. and the Unequal Burdens Test 
In Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., the Ninth Circuit narrowed Title 
VII's appearance and grooming standard exception by stating that 
different appearance standards are permissible under Title VII if they 
impose equal burdens.61 Between 1980 and 1994, United Airlines 
("United") maintained distinct weight requirements for male and female 
flight attendants.62 For women, United based the standard on maximum 
weights for a medium female body frame.63 In contrast, United set the 
maximum weight requirement using a large male body frame.64 This 
difference meant that female flight attendants had to weigh fourteen to 
twenty-five pounds less than male flight attendants of the same height 
and age.65 After United disciplined or terminated several flight 
attendants who did not maintain the required weight limit, thirteen 
plaintiffs brought a class action suit against United alleging 
discrimination under Title VII.66 The Ninth Circuit held the weight 
requirements were facially discriminatory because they directly imposed 
disparate standards for men and women.67 The distinct disparate 
58 1d. 
59/d. at 755-56 ("[IJt follows that [employers] should be able to amend its regulations when 
they no longer reflect management's judgment regarding desirable dress and grooming standards. 
Likewise, an employer may enforce those regulations that it believes its particular business requires . 
. . power to amend regulations for one sex independent of any action with respect to the regulations 
for the other sex flows directly from the employer's power to promulgate separate regulations in the 
first place."). 
60 Id. at 756; see Baker, 507 F.2d at 898. 
61 See Frank, 216 F.3d at 848, 854-55. 
62 1d. at 848. United imposed the employment policy using a Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company publication, which set forth desirable weights and heights of males and females. Id. 
63 1d. 
64 Id. 
65 1d. ("For example, the maximum weight for a 5'7", 30-year-old woman was 142 pounds, 
while a man of the same height and age could weigh up to 161 pounds. A 5'11", 50-year-old 
woman could weigh up to 162 pounds, while the limit for a man of the same height and age was 185 
pounds."). 
66 ld. 
67 /d. at 847 (''The uncontroverted evidence shows that United chose weight maximums for 
women that generally corresponded to the medium frame category of MetLife's Height and Weight 
Tables. By contrast, the maximums for men generally corresponded to MetLife's large frame 
8
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measurements apparent on the face of the policy triggered Title VII 
. 68 protectIOn. 
Though United sought to defend the policy as an appearance and 
grooming standard outside of Title VII purview, the court's holding 
alluded to what would eventually become known as the unequal burdens 
test.69 The court held: 
It is true that not all sex-differentiated appearance standards constitute 
disparate treatment that must be justified under Title VII as BFOQs. 
An appearance standard that imposes different but essentially equal 
burdens on men and women is not disparate treatment ... "regulations 
promulgated by employers which require male employees to conform 
to different grooming and dress standards than female employees is 
not sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII.,,7o 
Therefore, under Frank, different appearance and grooming standards are 
permissible under Title VII if they impose equal burdens on the 
employees.71 Conversely, if the appearance and grooming standards 
impose an unequal burden, then the employer must show that the 
disparate treatment is justified by a BFOQ.72 Employers maintain the 
ability to impose sex-distinct appearance and grooming standards, if 
those standards do not impose an unequal burden.73 
Although the Ninth Circuit initially excluded appearance and 
grooming standards from Title VII purview, in Frank the court modified 
its original approach by considering the relative burdens placed on 
employees by sex-distinct employment policies.74 
category . . .. Because of this consistent difference in treatment of women and men, we conclude 
that United's weight policy between 1980 and 1994 was facially discriminatory.") The court based 
its determination in large part on a previous Ninth Circuit airline case, which stated, "[ w 1 here a 
claim of discriminatory treatment is based upon a policy which on its face applies less favorably to 
one gender ... a plaintiff need not otherwise establish the presence of discriminatory intent." Id., 
(citing Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 608). 
68 Id. at 854. 
69 1d. at 854-55. 
70 1d. (citing Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977». 
71 1d. ("Even if United's weight rules constituted an appearance standard, they would still be 
invalid. A sex-differentiated appearance standard that imposes unequal burdens on men and women 
is disparate treatment that must be justified as a BFOQ ... United may not impose different and 
more burdensome weight standards without justifying those standards as BFOQs.") (emphasis in 
original). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 854-55. 
74 Baker, 507 F.2d at 897; Frank, 216 F.3d at 854-55. 
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II. JESPERSEN V. HARRAH'S OPERATING CO. 
In Jespersen, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a mandatory 
makeup requirement for female beverage servers was a discriminatory 
appearance and grooming standard under Title VII.75 
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2000, Harrah's Operating Company, ("Harrah's"), "the world's 
premier provider of branded casino entertainment,,,76 implemented the 
Beverage Department Image Transformation ("BDIT"), which 
emphasized guest service and imposed detailed appearance standards on 
all guest service employees.77 Through this program, Harrah's hoped to 
create a brand standard of excellence throughout its establishments, 
starting with the visual presentation of all guest service employees.7S 
The BDIT included the Personal Best Image Program ("PBIP"), a new 
appearance and grooming policy for Harrah's employees.79 In addition 
to sex-neutral appearance provisions, the PBIP outlined sex-specific 
standards for male and female beverage servers.80 The policy required 
female employees to wear their hair "teased, curled, or styled," nail 
polish of particular colors, and stockings of a natural color matching the 
75 Jespersen II. 392 F.3d at 1081-83. 
76 Harrah 's.com: About Us - Index, http://investor.harrahs.com/(last visited Feb. 26, 2006) 
("Founded in 1937, Harrah's Entertainment owns or manages through various subsidiaries more than 
forty casinos in three countries, primarily under the Harrah's, Caesars and Horseshoe brand 
names."). 
77 Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at 1077 ("In February 2000, Harrah's implemented its 'Beverage 
Department Image Transformation' program at twenty Harrah's locations, including its casino in 
Reno."). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1077-78 ("Harrah's required each beverage service employee to attend 'Personal 
Best Image Training' prior to his or her final uniform fitting ... 'Personal Best Image Facilitators' 
instructed Harrah's employees on how to adhere to the standards of the program .... At the 
conclusion of the training, two photographs (one portrait and one full body) were taken of the 
employee looking his or her 'Personal Best' .... [S]upervisors used the 'Personal Best' photographs 
as an 'appearance measurement' tool, holding each. employee accountable to look his or her 
'Personal Best' on a daily basis."). 
80 Id. at 1077 n.1 ("Overall Guidelines (applied equally to male/female): Appearance: Must 
maintain Personal Best Image; Jewelry, if issued, must be worn ... Otherwise, tasteful and simple 
jewelry permitted; no faddish hairstyles or unnatural colors are permitted. Males: Hair must not 
extend below top of shirt collar. Ponytails are prohibited. Hands and fingernails must be clean and 
nails neatly trimmed at all times. No colored polish is permitted. Eye and facial makeup is not 
permitted. Females: Hair must be teased, curled, or styled every day you work. Hair must be worn 
down at all times, no exceptions. Stockings are to be of nude or natural color consistent with 
employee's skin tone. No runs. Nail polish can be clear, white, pink, or red color only. No exotic 
nail art or length. "). 
10
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employee's skin tone.8! The provisions for male beverage servers 
prohibited "makeup or colored nail polish" and required male beverage 
servers to "maintain short haircuts and trimmed nails.,,82 Shortly after 
implementation, Harrah's amended the standards to include a mandatory 
makeup requirement for all female beverage servers.83 
Darlene Jespersen worked as a bartender at Harrah's for almost 
twenty years prior to implementation of the PBIP.84 She maintained a 
high customer satisfaction rating and Harrah's considered her an 
outstanding employee.85 Jespersen participated in PBIP and BDIT 
training programs but found that she could not successfully perform her 
job wearing a full face of makeup.86 Specifically, she felt that wearing 
makeup interfered with her ability to interact with customers and 
diminished her credibility as an experienced bartender.87 Accordingly, 
Jespersen refused to comply with the mandatory makeup provision.88 
Because of her refusal, Harrah's informed Jespersen of available 
alternative employee positions which would not require compliance with 
the makeup requirement.89 Jespersen did not apply for these positions 
and continued to ignore the makeup requirement.9o Harrah's terminated 
her for failure to comply with the mandatory BDIT and PBIP standards.9! 
Jespersen brought a Title VII suit against Harrah's claiming that the 
BDITIPBIP makeup requirement for female beverage servers constituted 
disparate treatment under Title VII and discriminated against Jespersen 
because of her sex.92 
Upon a motion by the defendant, the United States District Court for 
the District of Nevada granted summary judgment for Harrah's.93 The 
81 Id. at 1077. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 1077-78 ('The amended policy required that '[m]akeup (foundation/concealer and/or 
face powder, as well as blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in complimentary 
colors,' and that '[I]ip color must be worn at all times. "'). 
84 Id. at 1077. 
85 Id. ("Over the years, Jespersen's supervisors commented that she was 'highly effective,' 
that her attitude was 'very positive,' and that she made a 'positive impression' on Harrah's guests. 
Harrah's customers repeatedly praised Jespersen on employee feedback forms, writing that 
Jespersen's excellent service and good bar attitude enhanced their experience at the sports bar and 
encouraged them to come back."). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1077-78. 
89 Jespersen I, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. 
90 Id. 
91 Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at \077. 
92 Id. at 1078. 
93 Jespersen I, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. 
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court found that the BDITIPBIP policies did not violate Title VII because 
there was no discrimination against Jespersen based on immutable 
characteristics associated with sex.94 The district court evaluated 
Jespersen's claim under the unequal burdens test and found that the 
BDITIPBIP appearance policies imposed equal burdens based on 
mutable characteristics on both sexes, thereby leaving no question of fact 
for a jury to consider.95 Jespersen appealed the grant of summary 
judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.96 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT' S ANALYSIS 
Of the three-judge appellate panel, Judge Wallace Tashima and 
Judge Barry Silverman affirmed the district court's grant of summary 
judgment for Harrah's.97 Judge Sidney Thomas dissented, arguing that 
Jespersen had raised a triable issue of fact.98 
1. The Majority Opinion 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied the unequal burdens test to 
evaluate Jespersen's discrimination claim against Harrah's.99 The court 
reviewed previous decisions from Baker and Fountain, which held that 
"grooming and appearance standards that apply differently to women and 
men do not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex.,,100 The court 
then discussed Frank where the Ninth Circuit limited the appearance and 
grooming exception holding, "[a]lthough employers are free to adopt 
94 [d. at 1192. The court noted that because the makeup requirement involves a mutable 
characteristic, it did not burden opportunities for employment based on sex. [d. The court 
reaffirmed that different but equal appearance and grooming practices based on mutable 
characteristics are not within Title VII control. [d. 
95 [d. at 1193 ("[PJrohibiting men from wearing makeup may be just as objectionable to 
some men as forcing women to wear makeup is to Plaintiff .... Because a fair reading of the policy 
indicates that it is applied 'evenhandedly to employees of both sexes,' ... we conclude that this 
situation is more like the sex-differentiated standards that impose equal but different burdens on both 
sexes, than that discussed in Frank which imposed a different and heavier burden on women." 
(citation omitted». 
96 Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at 1077. 
97 [d. 
98 [d. at 1087 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
99 [d. at 1083 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
100 /d. at 1080 ("In Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., ... we concluded that grooming and dress 
standards were entirely outside the purview of Title VII because Congress intended that Title VII 
only prohibit discrimination based on 'immutable characteristics' associated with a worker's sex. 
Because grooming and dress standards regulated 'mutable' characteristics such as hair length, we 
reasoned, employers that made compliance with such standards a condition of employment 
discriminated on the basis of their employees' appearance, not their sex."). 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol36/iss1/5
2006] MAKING-UP CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT 57 
different appearance standards for each sex, they may not adopt 
standards that impose a greater burden on one sex than the other." 101 
However, the Ninth Circuit had difficulty defining the precise terms of 
the test. 102 The court noted: 
[b]ecause the question is not presented on this record, we do not need 
to define the exact parameters of the "unequal burdens" test, as 
applied to personal appearance and grooming. We do note, however, 
that this is not an exact science yielding results with mathematical 
certainty. We further note that any "burden" to be measured under the 
"unequal burdens" test is only that burden which is imposed beyond 
the requirements of generally accepted good grooming standards. 103 
Noting factors such as "cost and time necessary" to comply with the 
policy in question, the court stated it would evaluate the "actual impact" 
a requirement has on both male and female employees. I04 This 
evaluation compares the weight of the alleged discriminatory provision 
of one sex against the weight of the entire policy for the other sex. 105 
Therefore, the court contrasted the burden of the makeup requirement 
with the relative burden of the entire male appearance policy. 106 
Jespersen argued that gender stereotyping and other intangible 
burdens inherent in Harrah's makeup requirement imposed a disparate 
burden on women and therefore constituted a discriminatory appearance 
and grooming standard. 107 Jespersen also focused on how the 
requirement substantially affected her performance as a bartender. 108 She 
101 1d. (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original) (citing Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 
S45, S55 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
102 Id. at lOS!. 
103 Id. at lOS I n.4. 
104 Id. at lOS!. 
105 1d. Harrah's argued that the alleged makeup requirement burden be compared to the male 
grooming requirements as a whole. Id. On the other hand, Jespersen argued the makeup 
requirement should only be compared to the makeup prohibition for the men. Id. The Ninth Circuit 
agreed with Harrah's that the burden of the makeup requirement should be compared to the burdens 
of male appearance policy as a whole. Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Jespersen I, 2S0 F. Supp.2d at 1193-94 ("We are mindful that the true gravamen of 
Plaintiff s complaint appears to be that it is discriminatory to force a woman to wear makeup 
because she feels it is exploitive and perpetuates women's roles as sex objects. Plaintiff believes 
Defendant's policy negatively impacts women by portraying them in this stereotypical manner. She 
argues that Defendant should not treat women like 'Barbie' dolls."). 
108 Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at 1077 ("Although Jespersen never cared for makeup, she tried 
wearing it for a short period of time in the 19S0s. But she found that wearing makeup made her feel 
sick, degraded, exposed and violated. Jespersen felt that wearing makeup 'forced her to be 
feminine' and to become 'dolled up' like a sexual object, and that wearing makeup actually 
interfered with her ability to be an effective bartender (which sometimes required her to deal with 
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further argued that the customers' perception of her as a Harrah's 
employee changed when she wore makeup. 109 
However, the Ninth Circuit did not view these intangible burdens as 
persuasive evidence of discriminatory treatment. llo The court explained 
that according to its analysis under the unequal burdens test, Jespersen 
did not present sufficient evidence of a disparate burden to present a jury 
question. lII Instead, the court returned to the Baker approach, which 
allows sex -distinct appearance policies, and challenged Jespersen's lack 
of evidence regarding the disparate time and expense involved in 
complying with the appearance policy.ll2 The Ninth Circuit found that 
without concrete evidence of a disparate burden, such as receipts 
showing the cost of makeup supplies and documentation of the additional 
time required to maintain a made-up look throughout the work shift, 
there was no question of fact for a jury to decide. 113 Therefore, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that she failed to prove that the BDITIPBIP imposed 
an unequal burden on women. 114 The court accordingly affirmed the 
district court's decision of summary judgment in favor of Harrah' S.115 
2. The Dissent 
In the dissent, Judge Thomas argued that while disparate 
quantitative burdens such as expense are important considerations under 
a Title VII appearance standards analysis, the analysis should include 
unruly, intoxicated guests) because it 'took away [her] credibility as an individual and as a 
person. "'); see also id. at 1086 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Jespersen testified very compellingly to 
the burdens she personally felt in complying with the makeup policy, explaining that it required to 
conform with a feminine stereotype that she felt had nothing to do with making drinks. Given her 
stellar customer and supervisor evaluations, Jespersen is obviously not alone in this analysis."). 
109 Id. at 1081. 
1I0 1d. 
III Id. at 1083. 
112/d. at 1081 ("Jespersen cites to academic literature discussing the cost and time burdens of 
cosmetics generally, but she presents no evidence as to the cost or time burdens that must be borne 
by female bartenders in order to comply with the makeup requirement. . .. Because there is no 
evidence in the record from which we can assess the burdens that the 'Personal Best' policy imposes 
on male bartenders either, Jespersen's claim fails for that reason alone."). 
113/d. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 1083. The court granted a rehearing en banc on May 13, 2005. See Jespersen v. 
Harrah's Operating Co., 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). Oral arguments were held on June 22, 2005. 
The en banc court affirmed the three-judge panel decision that Jespersen failed to create a triable 
issue of fact. See United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; Ninth Circuit Opinions, 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov(lastvisitedApriI15.2006).This Note went to print prior to the 
publishing of the ell ballc decision. 
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other factors. 116 Judge Thomas was particularly troubled that the 
grooming policy conformed to traditional notions of what a female is 
"supposed" to look like. I 17 Judge Thomas stated: 
the majority neglects burdens other than time and money that are 
imposed by the policy. The sex-stereotyping inherent in certain 
appearance standards is a burden that falls more heavily on one sex 
than the other. Thus, we have recognized that the unequal burdens test 
does not permit sex-differentiated aPRearance standards that denigrate 
one gender based on sex stereotypes. 18 
While "[not] all gender-differentiated appearance requirements are 
prohibited[,]" Judge Thomas noted that, "what violates Title VII are 
those that rest upon a message of gender subordination.,,1l9 
Citing Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings and Loan Association of 
Chicago, Judge Thomas explained that the makeup requirement imposed 
solely on women beverage servers creates a "natural tendency to assume 
that the ... women have a lesser professional status.,,120 In Carroll, the 
Seventh Circuit held that single-sex uniform policy imposed negative 
assumptions and demeaning stereotypes upon the women that had to 
conform to the policy.121 Similarly in Jespersen, the makeup 
requirement required female employees to "costume" themselves in 
gender. 122 It created a visible distinction between male and female 
beverage servers based on traditional gender stereotypes. 123 According 
to Judge Thomas, if the court considered intangible factors such as 
gender stereotyping in the unequal burdens test, Harrah's motion for 
summary judgment would fail.124 
III. DISCUSSION 
Employment policies such as Harrah's BDITIPBIP standards that 
require individuals to conform to outdated sex stereotypes are 
116 Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at 1085-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
117 [d. at 1086 (Thomas, J., dissenting). ('This is not to say that all gender-differentiated 
appearance requirements are prohibited; what violates Title VII are those that rest upon a message of 
gender subordination. The distinction is apparent in the history of our caselaw on grooming and 
appearance standards under Title VII. "). 
118 [d. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
119 [d. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
120 Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032-33. 
121 Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at 1086 (Thomas, 1., dissenting). 
122 [d. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
123 /d. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
124 [d. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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discriminatory and limit employment opportunities. 125 The unequal 
burdens test fails to detect significant discriminatory elements of 
appearance and grooming policies. It sidesteps Title VII caselaw from 
both the Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court that protects 
employees from discrimination based on gender stereotyping.126 The 
Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse 127 is an example how 
including intangible considerations such as gender stereotyping would 
provide for greater protection for employees. 128 The Seventh Circuit 
case of Carroll, discussed in Judge Thomas's Jespersen dissent also 
reveals the inadequacies of the current unequal burdens test. 129 
Additionally, incorporating a job-relatedness component in the initial 
evaluation of burdens would create a more effective analysis of 
appearance and grooming policies under Title VII. 
A. MORE SIMILAR THAN DIFFERENT: ApPLYING THE PRICE 
WATERHOUSE TEST To JESPERSEN 
In Jespersen, the Ninth Circuit should have incorporated 
considerations of gender stereotyping in the unequal burdens analysis 
based on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Price Waterhouse. In Price 
Waterhouse, the Court held that like sex, gender stereotyping was an 
unacceptable consideration in employment discrimination. 13o Jespersen 
argued that Price Waterhouse applied to her discrimination claim. 131 
However, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that Price 
Waterhouse "did not address the specific question of whether an 
employer can impose sex-differentiated appearance and grooming 
standards on its male and female employees.',\32 Therefore, since Price 
Waterhouse did not specifically address appearance and grooming 
standards, the gender stereotyping principles did not apply to Jespersen's 
claim. 133 
By neglecting to apply Price Waterhouse, the Jespersen court 
distinguished between an employer that imposes stereotype-based 
125 See Brief of Amici Curiae the National Center for Lesbian Rights and the Transgender 
Law Center in Support of Plaintiff Appellant, Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co .. 392 F.3d 1076 
(9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-15045), 2005 WL 1501598. 
126 Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at 1084-86 (Thomas, 1., dissenting). 
127 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. 
128 See Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at 1083-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
129 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
130 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. 
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appearance standards and an employer that uses gender stereotypes to 
influence employment decisions. 134 This distinction means that a case's 
outcome would tum on whether the company actually instituted a 
grooming policy based on gender stereotypes or used considerations of 
gender stereotyping in making employment decisions. In Price 
Waterhouse, the Supreme Court focused particular attention on a 
partner's comment advising the plaintiff to "dress more femininely, wear 
makeup, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." 135 The Court used this 
language to show how discriminatory considerations played a role in 
determining the plaintiffs eligibility for partner. 136 From the Ninth 
Circuit ruling in Jespersen, however, it seems to follow that if Price 
Waterhouse instituted an appearance and grooming policy that required 
women to wear lipstick, while prohibiting men from doing the same, the 
appearance policy would have been valid under Title VII and the unequal 
burdens test. 137 According to Price Waterhouse, allowing gender 
stereotypes to influence employment decisions is discriminatory. 138 
Based on Jespersen, however, the formal imposition of such stereotypes 
through employee grooming policies is not discriminatory unless there is 
some unequal burden. 139 The unequal burdens test thus provides 
employees insufficient protection from discrimination based on gender 
stereotypes. 
Courts should especially be critical of such appearance and 
grooming policies that mandate superficial conformity to outdated 
stereotypes of what is "male" or "female." By allowing an exception in 
grooming standards, the Jespersen court permitted employers to make 
employment policies demanding the exact stereotypes the Ninth Circuit 
ruled as discriminatory harassment and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as 
encroaching on Title VII. 140 The Ninth Circuit should incorporate 
intangible considerations such as gender stereotyping in the unequal 
burdens analysis. This would provide more protection for employees 
from discriminatory appearance and grooming policies. 
B. BOLSTERING THE UNEQUAL BURDENS TEST 
Like the U.S. Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse, the Ninth Circuit 
134 Id. 
135 Price Waterhouse. 490 U.S. at 235. 
136/d. 
137 See Jespersen II. 392 F.3d at 1082. 
138 Price Waterhouse. 490 U.S. at 258. 
139 Jespersen 11.392 F.3d at 1082. 
140 Id.; see Price Waterhouse. 490 U.S. at 258. 
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should include considerations of gender stereotyping in the unequal 
burdens test. In Frank v. United Airlines, the Ninth Circuit signaled a 
departure from traditional evaluations of grooming standards. 141 The sex 
distinct weight requirements were facially discriminatory, but the policy 
also imposed unequal intangible burdens.142 The weight requirements 
were found to be more burdensome on women, not because of any 
economic consideration of time or cost, but because of the intangible 
burden that adhering to such requirements placed on female flight 
attendants. 143 In Jespersen, however, the Ninth Circuit disregarded the 
precedent in Frank and Price Waterhouse by focusing on evidence of 
economic effects as proof of unequal burdens in a disparate treatment 
claim.l44 While considerations of cost and time are significant factors in 
evaluating disparate treatment, courts must consider the less tangible 
effects of such policies. More so than money or time, employment 
policies that subject employees to gender stereotyping are discriminatory 
under Title VII. 
While refusing to rely on Price Waterhouse in Jespersen, the Ninth 
Circuit has extended Title vn protection based on gender stereotyping to 
a sexual harassment claim. 145 In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant 
Enterprises, Inc. the plaintiff sued the employer for harassment based on 
the plaintiffs non-conformity to gender-based stereotypes.146 The Ninth 
Circuit, citing Price Waterhouse, granted the plaintiff relief due to 
harassment and discrimination based on sex stereotypes.147 The court 
stated, "Price Waterhouse sets a rule that bars discrimination on the basis 
of sex stereotypes . . .. That rule squarely applies to preclude the 
harassment here.,,148 The Ninth Circuit, later noted, however, that 
[w]e do not imply that all gender-based distinctions are actionable 
under Title VII. For example, our decision does not imply that there is 
any violation of Title VII occasioned by reasonable regulations that 
require male and female employees to conform to different dress and 
141 Frank, 216 F.3d at 855. 
142 [d. 
143 [d. 
144 Jespersen I/, 392 F.3d at 1081. 
145 Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2(01). 
146 [d. at 874-75 ("At its essence, the systematic abuse directed at [plaintiff] Sanchez reflected 
a belief that Sanchez did not act as a man should act. Sanchez was attacked for walking and carrying 
his tray 'like a woman' - i.e., for having feminine mannerisms .... We conclude that this verbal 
abuse was closely linked to gender."). 
147 [d. 
148/d. at 874. 
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. d d 149 groommg stan ar s. 
A case for sexual harassment is different from a grooming standards 
challenge; however, the Ninth Circuit used Price Waterhouse to protect 
the plaintiff in Nichols from harassment based on gender stereotypes. 150 
The court left room for a flexible interpretation by stating that 
"reasonable regulations" may not be affected by Price Waterhouse. 151 
Appearance and grooming policies based on traditional gender 
stereotypes and lacking any relation to an employee's job responsibilities 
are not reasonable. By incorporating Price Waterhouse in evaluating 
appearance and grooming standards, the court would better protect 
employees from discriminatory policies. 
Based on the Ninth Circuit's evaluation in Nichols and the Seventh 
Circuit's decision in Carroll, gender stereotyping is a significant 
consideration in evaluating discrimination claims under Title VII. 
Because the Ninth Circuit applied Price Waterhouse to the harassment 
claim in Nichols 152, it should incorporate those same considerations of 
gender stereotyping to appearance and grooming policies. The Ninth 
Circuit's unequal burdens test ignores the significant concern of the 
intangible effect appearance and grooming policies have on the 
employee and his or her ability to perform. 153 Policies that generate sex-
distinct perceptions of employees performing the same jobs are equally 
as discriminatory as policies that impose different quantitative burdens. 
C. INCORPORATING JOB-RELATEDNESS INTO THE UNEQUAL BURDENS 
TEST 
The Ninth Circuit must also consider the relationship between an 
appearance and grooming standard and the actual occupational role of 
the employee. Under the unequal burdens test, an employer procedurally 
does not present the narrow Bona Fide Occupational Qualification 
defense or a rationale for the grooming policy until after a plaintiff 
proves that a disparate burden exists. 154 Discussion of any job-
relatedness component of the policy is thus postponed in the 
evaluation. 155 In many instances, this is too late for the job-relatedness 
149 [d. at 874-75 n.7. 
150 [d. at 874-75. 
151 [d. at 874-75 n.7. 
152 [d. at 874-75. 
153 Jespersen II, 392 F.3d at 1086 (Thomas, 1., dissenting). 
154 Frank, 216 F.3d at 854-55. 
155 [d. at 855 ("It is true that not all sex-differentiated appearance standards constitute 
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consideration to take place. Where, like Jespersen, there is little concrete 
evidence of a disparate burden, evaluating the lack of relationship 
between the policy and the occupation would help a plaintiff meet the 
initial burden of the unequal burdens test. Additionally, job-relatedness 
is a critical consideration in determining the arbitrary or discriminatory 
quality of a policy. 
If courts allow employers to have discretion in creating sex-distinct 
appearance and grooming policies, courts must also address the job-
relatedness element earlier in the analysis. In Fernandez v. Wynn, the 
plaintiff alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII based on the 
employer's refusal to promote the plaintiff based on gender. 156 In 
evaluating Wynn for promotion, the employer was concerned that 
international clients would not be comfortable making business deals 
with a female professional. 157 The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff 
was not otherwise qualified for the position, making the plaintiff s prima 
facie case fail under the McDonnell Douglas formulation. 158 In dicta, 
however, the court assessed the district court's discussion of the 
employer's alternative defense. 159 The employer argued that sex 
constituted a BFOQ when the position called for business relations with 
countries who did not allow women in the workplace. 16o While affirming 
judgment for the employer, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's 
analysis of the BFOQ defense, stating, "stereotypic impressions of male 
and female roles do not qualify gender as a BFOQ.,,161 The court 
continued the analysis, asserting, "customer preference based on sexual 
stereotype cannot justify discriminatory conduct.,,162 Therefore, if the 
court had found the Fernandez plaintiff qualified for the job, meeting her 
disparate treatment that must be justified under Title VII as BFOQs. An appearance standard that 
imposes different but essentially equal burdens on men and women is not disparate treatment. A 
sex-differentiated appearance standard that imposes unequal burdens on men and women is disparate 
treatment that must be justified as BFOQ."). 
156 Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1981). 
157 [d. at 1276. 
158 [d. at 1275 (''Testimony was presented that Fernandez was not proficient in the English 
language and had difficulty with articulation. She had no secondary education. Borrello testified 
that he did not seriously consider Fernandez because she had a drinking problem and erratic work 
habits. He also testified that she was indiscreet in her criticism of him and in infringing on the job 
authority of others ... there was testimony that she had exhibited poor supervisory and marketing 
skills. Fernandez has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in failing to find her 
qualified for the 010 [Director of International Operations] position."). 
159 [d. at 1277. 
160 [d. 
161 [d. at 1276-77. 
162 [d. at 1277; see also Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 
1971). 
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prima facie case, the employer's BFOQ would have likely failed and the 
court may have found for the plaintiff. 
The Fernandez court's discussion of the defendant's invalid BFOQ 
arguments 163 significantly supports incorporating job-relatedness into the 
unequal burdens analysis. Harrah's likely rationale for the makeup 
requirement is to attract customers. This would fail as a BFOQ under the 
Fernandez court's assertion that employers may not rely on customer 
preference to justify discrimination. l64 Additionally, the appearance 
policy is grounded in gender stereotypes, which according to Fernandez 
cannot "qualify ... as a BFOQ.,,165 The Ninth Circuit in Jespersen never 
reached that point in the analysis, however, because Jespersen could not 
meet the burden of proving a tangible disparity.166 This gap in the 
court's analysis left Jespersen unprotected from the discrimination 
inherent in the policy and wholly unrelated to her job description. The 
court must incorporate a job-relatedness element in the initial weighing 
of the burdens to assure that appearance polices are not only equally 
applied but also reasonably related to employment. 
Jespersen could have benefited from this kind of analysis. 
Jespersen presented evidence that she was an exceptional Harrah's 
employee prior to the implementation of the BDITIPBIP policies. 167 
While Harrah's claimed that the appearance policies created a "brand 
standard of excellence," it did not implement the BDITIPBIP policies at 
all forty casino locations. 168 This inconsistency indicated that the 
appearance policy and makeup requirement were not necessary to 
Harrah's business operations. Jespersen had a high customer service 
rating and maintained her position for close to twenty years. 169 Based on 
her exceptional work history, Jespersen could successfully complete her 
job as a bartender without makeup, making it not only a nonessential 
element of job performance, but wholly unrelated to her duties as a 
bartender. 170 There is no obvious connection between tending bar in a 
casino and wearing a full face of makeup. According to the court, 
however, because Jespersen did not provide sufficient evidence of a 
disparate time requirement or economic burden, Harrah's did not have to 
163 Fernandez. 653 F.2dat 1276-77. 
164 [d. at 1277. 
165 /d.; see also Diaz. 442 F.2d at 389. 
166 Jespersen 11.392 F.3d at 1081. 
167 [d. at 1076-77. 
168 [d. 
169 [d. 
170 [d. at 1086 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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&. • h ak . 171 present any reason lor Imposmg tern eup reqUIrement. 
Plaintiffs should be allowed to expose disparities, such as lack of a 
rational relationship to the employee's duties, in their initial case of 
discrimination. To protect plaintiffs like Jespersen that cannot meet the 
initial burden with concrete evidence of time and cost, despite a 
discriminatory policy, the court must look at the entire context of policy, 
including whether or not the policy has a reasonable purpose for being 
imposed. In doing so, courts could detect discriminatory employment 
policies, which may impose "equal" tangible burdens, but are based on 
gender stereotypes and have little or no relation to the tasks that the 
employee will perform. 
Like focusing on the qualifications of the employee, identifying the 
connection between an appearance policy and job qualifications is an 
important issue in initially determining whether a policy is 
discriminatory. A job-relatedness element would limit arbitrary and 
discriminatory employment policies. Sex-distinct appearance and 
grooming policies based on employer discretion must be grounded in 
reason.172 Incorporating a job-relatedness element in the initial 
consideration of disparate burdens would give the court an opportunity to 
address this objective of Title VII protection. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
An employer's appearance and grooming policies create the first 
visual impression a business extends to its customers. 173 While an 
employer is entitled to choose the features of that impression, such 
discretion cannot mask acts of employment discrimination. Employment 
policies such as the Harrah's makeup requirement result in excluding 
entire protected categories of people from employment. Congress 
enacted Title VII to protect these people from employment 
discrimination. 174 
The Ninth Circuit's unequal burdens test does not advance the goals 
171 1d. at 1081. 
172 Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1032 ("So long as they find some justification in commonly accepted 
social norms and are reasonably related to the employer's business needs, such regulations are not 
necessarily violations of Title VII event though the standards prescribed differ somewhat for men 
and women."). 
173 See Brief of Amici Curiae Council for Employment Law Equity, et al. in Support of 
Defendant-Appellee, Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-
15045), 2003 WL 22340442 ("Employees' appearance and professionalism directly affect an 
employer's image and reputation. Imposing reasonable dress and grooming standards is a legitimate 
way for employers to protect their right to manage and maintain their public image."). 
174 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240. 
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of Title VII; instead, it permits discrimination through policies based on 
sex stereotyping. 175 The intended purpose of Title VII is to eliminate 
employment discrimination based on sex and gender. 176 Therefore, the 
Ninth Circuit must include gender stereotyping as a factor in its analysis. 
Moreover, a job-relatedness element would also provide greater 
protection for employees from arbitrary and discriminatory employment 
appearance and grooming policies. Finally, the Ninth Circuit should 
incorporate intangible considerations such as gender stereotyping in the 
unequal burdens test as well as weigh job-relatedness in the initial 
evaluation of the plaintiff s case. Such improvements would make the 
unequal burdens test a more effective method of Title VII protection. 
MEGAN KELLY * 
175 See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 125. 
176 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240-45 ("Congress' intent to forbid employers to take 
gender into account in making employment decisions appears on the face of the statute. . .. We 
take these words to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions ... since we know 
that the words 'because of' do not mean 'solely because of' we also know that Title VII meant to 
condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations."). 
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, CA; B.A. 
Political Science, 2003, University of California at Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA. Thank you to 
Professor Doris Ng, the GGU Law Review Board and Editors, family, and friends. 
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